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Abstract
This article explores the legality of the land closure imposed upon the Gaza Strip by Israel. After having considered 
the area under occupation, the article argues that the legality of the closure must be determined under international 
humanitarian law, international human rights law, the principle of self-determination of peoples, and the Israeli-
Palestinian agreements. In light of these rules, the arbitrary closure of the Gaza Strip should be considered illegal 
because it breaches the unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and because it violates the freedom of 
movement of the local population. Moreover, the closure breaches the relevant rules pertaining to the transit of 
goods in occupied territory. This article concludes that most of the violations caused by the closure affect 
peremptory rules which produce obligations erga omnes, so that any state in the international community is entitled 
to react under the law of state responsibility.
*
 Lecturer in International Law. Although some of the research for this article was conducted in the framework of a project 
supported by the Norwegian Refugee Council, this paper reflects my views only. Thanks to Itay Epshtain for having 
discussed these issues with me. All internet references last accessed on 31 July 2020, when the manuscript was finalized. 
The usual disclaimers apply.
2This article aims at exploring the legality of the land closure imposed by Israel on the Gaza Strip, 
with particular reference to the freedom of movement of the Palestinians and of goods between the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Access to the Gaza Strip is currently restricted by both an air and 
maritime blockade and a land closure. Whereas the legality of the maritime blockade has been 
addressed by a number of UN bodies and states’ missions,1 receiving intense coverage by 
international scholarship as well,2 the legality of the land closure has been scrutinized only in a 
relatively cursory way.3 This article fills this void, exploring the legality of the land closure under a 
variety of applicable different international law rules.
After 2007, after Hamas’ victory in the elections in Gaza, Israel imposed a closure on the borders 
of the Gaza Strip.4 This closure was followed by a naval blockade established in 2009.5 Since then, 
the international community and international civil society have become increasingly concerned over 
the humanitarian situation of the Gaza Strip. Israel, on the basis of alleged security reasons, has 
imposed restrictions on the goods that can enter and exit the area, reducing dramatically the freedom 
of movement of persons from and into that territory. As a result, for a resident of the Gaza Strip today, 
it is not only very difficult to exit the area to go abroad, but also movement between the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank is seriously impaired. Since the specific measures adopted by Israel vary 
frequently, this article refers to the policy document published by the Coordination of Government 
1
 Report of the International Fact-Finding Mission to Investigate Violations of International Law, Including International 
Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, Resulting from the Attacks on the Flotilla of Ships Carrying Humanitarian 
Assistance, UN Doc. A/HRC/15/21 (2010); Israel, “The Public Commission to Examine the Maritime Incident of 31 May 
2010, The Turkel Commission Report” (23 January 2011), online: Jewish Virtual Library 
<www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_Culture/TurkelCommission.pdf>; Turkish National Commission of 
Inquiry, “Report on the Israeli Attack on the Humanitarian Aid Convoy to Gaza on 31 May 2010” (11 February 2011), 
online: Turkish Government <www.mfa.gov.tr/data/Turkish%20Report%20Final%20-%20UN%20Copy.pdf>; Report of 
the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31 May 2010 Flotilla Incident (July 2011), online: UN 
<www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/middle_east/Gaza_Flotilla_Panel_Report.pdf>.
2
 On this topic (and with some discussion of the land closure in connection to the blockade), see, e.g., Andrew SANGER, 
“The Contemporary Law of Blockade and the Gaza Freedom Flotilla” (2010) 13 Yearbook of International Humanitarian 
Law 397; Russel BUCHAN, “The International Law of Naval Blockade and Israel’s Interception of the Mavi Marmara” 
(2011) 58 Netherlands International Law Review 209; Douglas GUILFOYLE, “The Mavi Marmara Incident and 
Blockade in Armed Conflict” (2011) 81 British Yearbook of International Law 171; Noura ERAKAT, “It’s Not Wrong, 
It’s Illegal: Situating the Gaza Blockade between International Law and the UN Response” (2011) 11 UCLA Journal of 
Islamic & Near Eastern Law 37.
3
 For two exceptions, see Justus Reid WINER and Diane MORTIMER, “Legal Implications of “Safe Passage”: 
Reconciling a Viable Palestinian State with Israel’s Security Requirements” (2007) 22 Connecticut Journal of 
International Law 233; Michal LUFT, “Living in a Legal Vacuum: The Case of Israel’s Legal Position and Policy towards 
Gaza Residents” (2018) 51 Israel Law Review 193. 
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 Turkel Report, supra note 1 at para. 1.
3Activities in the Territories (COGAT) in August 2019, which governs the transit of persons and goods 
to and from the area since then.6
This article analyses the legality of closure of land and safe passage between the Gaza Strip and 
the West Bank, taking into account international humanitarian law, international human rights law, 
and other applicable rules of public international law. The article only addresses the legality of the 
closure itself, rather than all the legal consequences arising from the occupation and closure. The 
article addresses the relevant issues only from the standpoint of international law, even though the 
situation of the Gaza Strip could be analyzed from different non-legal perspectives as well. The 
research contributes to the existing scholarship by offering one of the first analysis of the freedom of 
movement in occupying territory, which could be useful to scrutinize the legality of the actions of 
occupying powers even outside the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT). 
The arguments herein are presented irrespective of any consideration as to whether Palestine is a 
state or not under international law,7 since this issue is not decisive to determine the legality of the 
closure. Accordingly, the questions analyzed below under the principle of self-determination of 
peoples, a fortiori, could be analyzed under the rules pertaining to state sovereignty. Similarly, the 
article does not challenge the Palestinian entitlement to join certain multilateral treaties if depositories 
have accepted the relevant applications,8 but rather, considers them as binding irrespective of any 
final determination on Palestinian statehood. Finally, it is entirely irrelevant to debate whether the 
Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) agreements should be considered binding only upon 
6
 Coordination of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), Unclassified Status of Authorizations for the Entry 
of Palestinians into Israel, their Passage between Judea and Samaria and the Gaza Strip and their Travel Abroad (updated 
as of 27 August 2019) (unofficial English translation), online: Gisha 
<www.gisha.org/UserFiles/File/LegalDocuments/procedures/general/50en.pdf>.
7
 For different views on the Palestinian statehood, see John QUIGLEY, The Statehood of Palestine: International Law in 
the Middle East Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Jean SALMON, “La qualité d’Etat de la 
Palestine” (2012) 45 Revue belge de droit international 13; Marco LONGOBARDO, “Lo Stato di Palestina: emersione 
fattuale e autodeterminazione dei popoli prima e dopo il riconoscimento dello status di Stato non membro delle Nazioni 
Unite” in Marcella DISTEFANO, ed., Il principio di autodeterminazione dei popoli alla prova del nuovo millennio 
(Padua: CEDAM, 2014), 9; Thierry GARCIA, ed., La Palestine: d’un etat non membre de l’organisation des Nations 
Unies a un etat souverain? (Paris: Pedone, 2015); Djamchid MOMTAZ, “La controverse sur le statut de la Palestine” in 
Rüdiger WOLFRUM et al., eds., Contemporary Developments in International Law: Essays in Honour of Budislav Vukas 
(Leiden: Brill, 2016) 102; Shadi SAKRAN, The Legal Consequences of Limited Statehood: Palestine in Multilateral 
Frameworks (Abingdon: Routledge, 2019). See, also, Asian-African Legal Consultative Organization, A Study on the 
Statehood of Palestine under International Law (New Delhi: AALCO, 2013). 
8
 On the Palestinian accession to these conventions, see Marco LONGOBARDO, “La recente adesione palestinese alle 
convenzioni di diritto umanitario e ai principali trattati a tutela dei diritti dell’uomo” (2014) 1 Ordine internazionale e 
diritti umani 771; Shadi SAKRAN and HAYASHI Mika, “Palestine’s Accession to Multilateral Treaties: Effective 
Circumvention of the Statehood Question and its Consequences” (2017) 25 Journal of International Cooperation Studies 
81.
4PLO as a movement of national liberation or, rather, also on the State of Palestine as its alleged 
successor.9 The use of the expression “Palestine” here should be interpreted accordingly, following 
the practice of the UN.10
The article is organized as follows. Section I explores the status of the Gaza Strip as an occupied 
territory, from which it is possible to identify the relevant applicable legal framework (Section II). 
Section III questions the legality of the closure in its entirety under the law of occupation. Section IV 
demonstrates that the West Bank and the Gaza Strip are a single territorial unity and that safe passage 
between the two areas is demanded by international law as a condition of maintaining said unity. 
Section V explores the freedom of movement of peoples between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
in light of applicable rules of international law protecting individual rights, whereas Section VI 
describes the legal framework applicable to the movement of goods. Section VII explores the 
remedies that can be adopted in relation to the violations of international law resulting from the land 
closure of the Gaza Strip. The article concludes that, although international law allows Israel to limit 
the freedom of movement of specific goods and persons on the basis of security grounds, the overall 
closure of the Gaza Strip is unlawful because it targets the entire population of the Gaza Strip.
I. THE GAZA STRIP AS OCCUPIED TERRITORY
In order to investigate the applicable legal framework and the legality of the closure of the Gaza Strip, 
this article first needs to assess whether the area is still under occupation. This article offers only a 
brief analysis of this complex issue that continues to attract significant attention in international 
scholarship.11
9
 On these agreements, see below Section 3.
10
 See A/RES/43/177 (15 December 1988) para 3.
11
 For a variety of opinions on this issue, see, e.g., Alain BOCKEL, “Le retrait israélien de Gaza et ses conséquences sur 
le droit international” (2005) 51 Annuaire français de droit international 16; Yuval SHANY, “Faraway, So Close: The 
Legal Status of Gaza after Israel’s Disengagement” (2005) 8 Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law 369; Iain 
SCOBBIE, “An Intimate Disengagement: Israel’s Withdrawal from Gaza, the Law of Occupation and of Self-
Determination” (2004–2005) 11 Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law 3; SD Dikker HUPKES, What Constitutes 
Occupation? Israel as the Occupying Power in the Gaza Strip after the Disengangement (Leiden: EM Meijers Instituut, 
2007); Shane DARCY and John REYNOLDS, “An Enduring Occupation: The Status of the Gaza Strip from the 
Perspective of International Humanitarian Law” (2010) 15 Journal of Conflict & Security Law 211; Konstantinos 
MASTORODIMOS, “How and When Do Military Occupations End?” (2009) 21 Sri Lanka Journal of International Law 
109; Solon SOLOMON, “Occupied or Not: The Question of Gaza’s Legal Status after the Israeli Disengagement” (2011) 
19 Cardozo Journal of International and Comparative Law 59; Eyal BENVENISTI, The International Law of Occupation, 
2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 211-212; Hanne CUYCKENS, “Is Israel Still an Occupying Power in 
Gaza?” (2016) 63 Netherlands International Law Review 275.
5First comprised in the defunct British Mandate and subsequently occupied by Egypt in 1949, the 
Gaza Strip has been under Israeli occupation since 1967, when Israel gained control of the area during 
the Six-Day War.12 During the 1990s, Israel and the PLO negotiated a regime of Palestinian 
administration for some parts of the Occupied Palestinian Territory, which was detailed in a number 
of agreements never fully implemented, such as the the 1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim 
Self-Government Arrangements,13 the 1994 Agreement on Gaza Strip and Jericho Area,14 and the 
1995 Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement.15 In 2005, Israel unilaterally decided to withdraw its 
military troops from the area, removing at the same time all the Israeli settlements, pursuant to the 
so-called Disengagement Plan.16 In 2007, following Hamas’ victory in the elections in Gaza, Israel 
declared the Gaza Strip as “hostile territory,”17 upgrading its status to “enemy territory” in 2014.18 
During the past decade, Israel has launched a number of largescale military operations in the Gaza 
Strip against Hamas and other armed groups, in response to the launch of mortars and rockets,19 
whereas less intense violence – to be dealt with in the context of law enforcement operations – erupted 
in 2018 close to the perimeter fence between the Gaza Strip and Israel.20
After the Disengagement, the government of Israel has claimed that it is no longer occupying the 
Gaza Strip, so that the law of occupation does not bind Israeli action in the area.21 The Supreme Court 
of Israel concurred on the termination of the occupation, even though it affirmed that Israel maintains 
some post-occupation responsibilities.22 Conversely, most international institutions consider that the 
12
 See, generally, Peter MALANCZUK, “Israel: Status, Territory and Occupied Territories” in Rudolf BERNHARDT, 
ed., Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1990), 149; Yoram DINSTEIN, The 
International Law of Belligerent Occupation, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 17.
13
 13 September 1993, text in 32 I.L.M. 1525.
14
 4 May 1994, text in 33 I.L.M. 622.
15
 28 September 1995, text in 37 I.L.M. 557.
16









 Israel, “The Torts Order (State Liability) (Declaration on Enemy Territory–Gaza Strip)” (7 October 2014) (unofficial 
English translation), online: Hamoked <www.hamoked.org/files/2015/1159680_eng.pdf>. 
19
 Operation Cast Lead (December 2008–January 2009); Operation Pillar of Clouds (November 2012); Operation 
Protective Edge (June–July 2014). 
20
 See Report of the Detailed Findings of the Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Protests in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/40/CRP.2 (2019).
21
 See, e.g., UN Doc. A/60/PV.5 (2005), 46.
22
 HCJ 9132/07, Al-Bassiouni Ahmed et al v. Prime Minister et al. (27 January 2008), para. 12, (unofficial English 
translation), online: Cardozo University 
<https://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Ahmed%20v.%20Prime%20Minister.pdf>. 
6Gaza Strip is still under Israeli occupation since Israel maintains total control over the maritime 
territory of the area, its airspace, its borders (with the exception of the Rafah crossing on the border 
with Egypt), and its vital supplies.23
To solve the conundrum of whether the Gaza Strip is still under occupation, one should note that 
international humanitarian law considers that a territory is under occupation if it is placed under the 
actual authority of a hostile force, pursuant to Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations (HR), which 
corresponds to international customary law.24 The relevant test is factual in nature,25 i.e., it is 
immaterial whether an occupying power considers itself bound by the law of occupation.26 There is 
nothing in Article 42 of the HR about the actual presence of troops in occupied territory as a necessary 
element to establish an occupation, but rather, international case law considered the physical 
deployment of troops to be one of the elements from which it is possible to conclude that an area is 
under occupation.27 In any case, what it is crucial in relation to the Gaza Strip is that the actual 
physical presence of enemy troops did establish the occupation in 1967, so that even supporters of 
the idea that an occupation can be established only with boots on the ground should concede that the 
test was met. Conversely, there is nothing in the law of occupation that suggests that the presence of 
troops  is a conditio sine qua non for the maintenance of an occupation after actual authority is 
established,28 especially when the occupying power exercise the same actual authority through other 
23
 UN Doc. S/RES/1860 (2009), preamble; UN Doc. A/RES/64/94 (2010), para. 4; UN Doc, A/HRC/12/48 (2009), paras. 
273–79; A/HRC/15/21 (2010), paras. 63–66; UN Doc. A/HRC/29/CRP.4 (2015), paras. 26–31; UN Doc. 
A/HRC/40/CRP.2 (2019), paras. 61–67; Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, “Situation on Registered Vessels of 
Comoros, Greece and Cambodia: Article 53(1) Report” (6 November 2014), paras. 27–29; “Prosecution request pursuant 
to article 19(3) for a ruling on the Court’s territorial jurisdiction in Palestine”, ICC-01/18-12 (22 January 2020), para. 80; 
Peter MAURER (as president of the ICRC), “Challenges to International Humanitarian Law: Israel’s Occupation Policy” 
(2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 1504 at 1506.
24
 See, e.g., Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
[2004] I.C.J. Rep. 136 at para. 79; Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), 
[2005] I.C.J. Rep. 168 at para. 172.
25
 See Tristan FERRARO, “Determining the Beginning and End of an Occupation under International Humanitarian Law” 
(2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 133 at 134-6. 
26
 US Military Manual (Washington, DC: Department of Defence, 2016) section 11.2.1.
27
 Prosecutor v. Naletilić, Trial Chamber, Judgment of 31 March 2003, para. 217; Prosecutor v. Prlić et al., Appeals 
Chamber, Judgment of 29 November 2017, para. 320.
28
 Tristan FERRARO, ed., Report on Expert Meeting, Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign 
Territory (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, 2012), 17; Julia GRIGNON, “The Geneva Conventions 
and the End of Occupation” in Andrew CLAPHAM, Paola GAETA and Marco SASSÒLI, eds., The 1949 Geneva 
Conventions: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 1575, at 1594–1595; Tristan FERRARO and 
Lindsey CAMERON, “Article 2: Application of the Convention” in ICRC, Updated Commentary on the First Geneva 
Convention (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2016), paras. 307-309.
7means.29  Indeed, under the law of occupation it is well-established that the occupying power does 
not need to control physically every square-meter of the occupied territory. 
Accordingly, taking into account the ongoing Israeli control over significant portions of Gaza 
territory – namely the territorial waters and airspace30 – and in light of the control over Gaza borders, 
supplies, and population registry, the Disengagement did not terminate Israel’s actual authority over 
the Gaza Strip,31 and as a result the law of occupation still applies.32 From a legal point of view, the 
Disengagement from the Gaza Strip must be considered as a redeployment of troops within an 
occupied territory comprising both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.33 The different degree of 
authority exercised by Israel after the Disengagement is relevant as a factual element to be taken into 
account in relation to the Israeli capacity of exercising responsibilities under the law of occupation in 
relation to those obligations that require the occupying power to do everything in its power to reach 
a certain aim (positive obligations of conduct).34
As mentioned afore, the conclusion that the Gaza Strip is still under occupation is not shared by 
the Supreme Court of Israel, according to which the area is no longer occupied.35 However, the 
Supreme Court of Israel maintains that Israel is still bound by some rules embodied in the law of 
occupation.36 As argued by some Israeli scholars, this conclusion is legally absurd: the consideration 
that Israel is bound by the law of occupation can only derive from the fact that the Gaza Strip is under 
occupation.37 Likewise, the designation of the Gaza Strip as “hostile territory” and “enemy territory” 
under Israeli domestic law has no consequence in relation to the characterization of the area as 
29
 For the opposite view, which unfortunately cannot be explored here in details, see Solomon, supra note 11; Eyal 
BENVENISTI, The International Law of Occupation, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 211-212; 
Cuyckens, supra note 11. 
30
 On the interpretation of the notion of territory under the law of occupation, see generally Marco LONGOBARDO, “The 
Occupation of Maritime Territory under International Humanitarian Law” (2019) 95 International Law Studies 322.
31
 See, e.g., Bockel, supra note 11 at 23; Carey JAMES, “Mere Words: The Enemy Entity Designation of the Gaza 
Strip” (2009) 32 Hastings International & Comparative Law Review 643; Darcy and Reynolds, supra note 11 at 235; 
Grignon, supra note at 1593-1596; Eric DAVID, Principes de Droit des Conflits Armés, 6th ed. (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 
2019), 699; Dinstein, supra note 12 at 297.
32
 This is also the positions of those who consider that the Gaza Strip is no longer occupied under the traditional test 
embodied in art. 42 of the HR, but the law of occupation should apply following a functional approach (see, e.g., Aeyal 
GROSS, The Writing on the Wall: Rethinking the International Law of Occupation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2017), 213-214).
33
 Ibid., at 298.
34
 This view has been suggested by the EECC, Partial Award: Western Front, Aerial Bombardment and Related Claims 
– Eritrea’s Claims 1, 3, 5, 9-13, 14, 21, 25 & 26, 19 Dec 2005, XXVI RIAA 291, para 27. See also Luft, supra note 3 at 
201.
35




 See, e.g., Yuval SHANY, “The Law Applicable to Non-Occupied Gaza: A Comment on Bassiouni v. The Prime 
Minister of Israel” (2009) 42 Israel Law Review 101 at 108; Dinstein, supra note 12 at 300-301.
8occupied territory. As mentioned above, under international humanitarian law it is irrelevant whether 
the occupying power acknowledges that an occupation exists. Moreover, by definition, the occupied 
territory is “hostile” and “enemy” territory, since occupation is a portion of an ongoing armed 
conflict.38 Accordingly, these definitions are devoid of any legal meaning and do not alter the 
conclusion that the Gaza Strip is under occupation.
It should be noted that the land closure and the blockade of the Gaza Strip, combined with the 
Disengagement Plan, have led some commentators to consider the situation of the Gaza Strip as that 
of a siege,39 whereas Israel has vocally rejected this proposition, preferring to refer to the situation as 
a closure.40 Labelling the situation of the Gaza Strip as a siege does not alter the characterization of 
the area as occupied territory. Under international humanitarian law, a siege “is a factual description 
of what is going on without any specific connotation.”41 In other words, there is no legal regulation 
of sieges as such, but rather, the key issue is whether a specific situation that we call siege can comply 
with international law.42 Contrary to the allusions of some observers,43 what is usually called siege is 
compatible with a situation of occupation if the siege occurs in a portion of territory from whence the 
occupying power has redeployed its troops. Sieges and blockades are methods of warfare and 
hostilities may occur in occupied territory without altering the situation of occupation, as affirmed by 
significant case law.44 In fact, the law of occupation embodies some references to hostilities in 
occupied territory, such as Article 49 of the GCIV (referring to “imperative military reasons”) and 
Article 53 of the GCIV (referring to “military operations”). Accordingly, the resort to a method of 
warfare such as a blockade or a siege does not necessarily imply that the occupation is over, but 
38
 See Marco LONGOBARDO, The Use of Armed Force in Occupied Territory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2018), 20-21. Indeed, the very Section III of the 1907 Hague Regulations (HR), which embodies rules applicable during 
an occupation, is labelled “Military authority over the territory of the hostile state” (Convention (IV) respecting the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land and its annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 205 CTS 
277).
39
 See, e.g., Shany, supra note 37; Gabriella VENTURINI, “L’operazione militare di Israele contro Gaza e il diritto 
internazionale umanitario” (2009) 3 Diritti umani e diritto umanitario 309 at 313.
40
 Israel, “Behind the Headlines: The Myth of an Israeli Siege on Gaza” (17 August 2014), online: Israeli Government 
<mfa.gov.il/MFA/ForeignPolicy/Issues/Pages/The-myth-of-an-Israeli-siege-on-Gaza-17-Aug-2014.aspx>. 
41
 Françoise HAMPSON, “A Terminological Issue: What Is a Siege?” (2015) Colloquium 91 at 93.
42
 See, generally, Emanuela-Chiara GILLARD, “Sieges, the Law and Protecting Civilians” (27 June 2019), online: 
Chatham House <www.chathamhouse.org/publication/sieges-law-and-PROTECTING-civilians>.
43
 See, e.g., Hampson, supra note 41 at 93; Marco SASSÒLI, International Humanitarian Law: Rules, Controversies, 
and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019), 306.
44
 US Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, Willelm List et al. (19 February 1948), (1948) 9 L.R.T.W.C. 34 ay 56; Naletilić 
case, supra note 27 at para. 217; Prlić case, supra note 27 at para. 320.
9rather, when hostilities erupt in occupied territory the situation must be assessed on a case-by-case 
basis.45
II. THE APPLICABLE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
To understand the legality of the closure on land of the Gaza Strip it is necessary to take into account 
a variety of applicable rules of public international law, both enshrined in treaties and developed in 
customary international law.
Since it is argued here that the Gaza Strip is under ongoing occupation, international humanitarian 
law and, in particular, the rules embodied in the HR and in the 1949 Four Geneva Conventions 
(GCs)46 apply. The rules contained in 1977 First Additional Protocol (API)47 apply as long as they 
reflect customary international law48 as Israel is not a party to the API. Following the opinion of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ),49 of some UN bodies,50 of Israel,51 and of most scholars,52 the 
law on international armed conflict is considered to be the correct legal framework rather than the 
law of non-international armed conflict. This is a consequence of the fact that, de lege lata, an 
occupation can be established only during an international armed conflict.53
Additionally, it is necessary to take into account various rules of international human rights law, 
particularly some of the rights enshrined in the 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political 
45
 For more on this, see Longobardo, supra note 38 at 198-204.
46
 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention) (12 
August 1949) 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
47
 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (8 June 1977) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
48
 See the authoritative collection of customary rules in Jean-Marie HENCKAERTS and Louise DOSWALD-BECK, 
eds., Customary International Humanitarian Law, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
49
 Wall opinion, supra note 24 at para. 124 (discussing the application of art. 23(g) of the HR).
50
 UN Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (2009), para. 77; UN Doc. A/HRC/15/21 (2010), paras. 62–66; Report of the Secretary-
General’s Panel, supra note 1 at para. 73. 
51
 HCJ 769/02, Public Committee against Torture in Israel v Israel, 14 Dec 2006, para 18, unofficial trans in (2007) 46 
I.L.M. 375; Al-Bassiouni case, supra note 22 at paras. 12–15; HCJ 201/09, Physicians for Human Rights v Prime Minister 
(19 January 2009), para. 14 (unofficial English translation), online: EYLON 
<elyon1.court.gov.il/files_eng/09/010/002/n07/09002010.n07.pdf>; The Turkel Commission, supra note 1 at paras. 41 
and 44.
52
 Antonio CASSESE, International Law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 420; Dapo AKANDE, 
“Classification of Armed Conflicts: Relevant Legal Concepts” in Elizabeth WILMSHURST, ed., International Law and 
the Classification of Conflicts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 32 at 47-48; Robert KOLB and Sylvain VITÉ, 
Le droit de l’occupation militaire (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2009), 352; Kenneth WATKIN, “Use of Force during Occupation: 
Law Enforcement and Conduct of Hostilities” (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 267 at 293; Noam 
ZAMIR, Classification of Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017), 166; 
Longobardo, supra note 38 at 226-29.
53
 See US Supreme Court, Ford v. Surget, (1878) 97 U.S. 594 at 614; SCSL, Prosecutor v. Sesay et al., Judgment of 2 
March 2009, paras. 982–988. See also US Military Manual, supra note 26 at section 11.1.3.3.
10
Rights (ICCPR)54 and the 1966 UN International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR).55 As it is well-known, the ICJ, in accordance with human rights regional courts and UN 
monitoring mechanisms, has affirmed on a number of occasions that international human rights law 
applies in situations of armed conflict and belligerent occupations, even when a state acts outside its 
territory.56 Accordingly, the occupying power must act in compliance with its international human 
rights law obligations when acting in the occupied territory,57 while respecting at the same time 
international humanitarian law. International case law demonstrates that the two sets of rules should 
be interpreted in light of one another to avoid, through interpretation, any possible normative 
conflict.58 For instance, the ICJ in the Nuclear Weapons opinion, under the label of lex specialis, 
applied international humanitarian law to interpret international human rights provisions applicable 
in armed conflict.59 This interpretive technique is possible thanks to the application of the rule 
codified in Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),60 
according to which “[t]here shall be taken into account, together with the context: … any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.”61 
The fact that Hamas administers Gaza should be taken into account in assessing Israeli compliance 
with positive obligations under international human rights law, especially in the field of socio-
economic rights. The substantive obligations of international human rights law, which applies as a 
whole because Israel is an occupying power, should be determined taking into account the existence 
and the role of the Palestinian administration.62 This is particularly relevant for negative obligations 
embodied in international human rights conventions, which are not linked to Hamas’s role in the Gaza 
54
 Text in 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
55
 Text in 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
56
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Military Occupation” (2012) 94 International Review of the Red Cross 317; Víctor Luis GUTIÉRREZ CASTILLO, “La 
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36 Revista Electrónica de Estudios Internacionales 1.
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interpretive criterion, see Richard GARDINER, Treaty Interpretation, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 
298-333.
62
 Lubell, supra note 57 at 323; Gross, supra note 32 at 214.
11
Strip. As suggested by the ICJ, Israel “is under an obligation not to raise any obstacle to the exercise 
of [human] rights in those fields where competence has been transferred to Palestinian authorities.”63 
As noted by a renowned expert, “while the context may modify the substance of the obligation, it 
does not remove it altogether; Israel is required not to actively raise obstacles with regard to the rights 
that the Palestinian Authority [and Hamas, mutatis mutandis] is administering.”64 The specific 
application of these rights, in light of these considerations, is discussed in a subsequent section.65
A variety of agreements concluded between Israel and the PLO in the 1990s specifically address 
legal issues that are relevant to determine the lawfulness of the Gaza Strip’s closure. In particular, the 
1993 Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, the 1995 Israeli-
Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and the 1999 Protocol 
Concerning Safe Passage between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip66 all embody rules that must be 
taken into account. Since at the time of the conclusions of these agreements the PLO was recognized 
as a movement of national liberation,67 it was a subject of international law with treaty-making power 
in relation to the exercise of the principle of self-determination of peoples.68 It follows that the Israel-
PLO agreements are binding treaties under international law69 and, accordingly, are sources of 
obligations both for the Palestinians and for Israel.70 Whether these treaties are still in force is a matter 
63
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65
 See infra, section V.B and V.C.
66
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67
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68
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Unies” (1974) 20 Annuaire français de droit international 173 at 198–9; Julio A. BARBERIS, “Nouvelles questions 
concernant la personnalité juridique international” (1983) 179 Recueil des Cours 145 at 259–64; Antonio CASSESE, 
Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 169; M. Angeles 
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69
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of debate: these agreements were meant to be interim accords that should have been replaced by a 
final agreement which, in fact, has never been adopted. However, it should be noted that these 
agreements have never been formally denounced, but rather, Israel relies on some of their 
provisions,71 while the numerous Palestinian threats to denounce them are evidence of the Palestinian 
belief that they are still binding.72 Moreover,  the international community keeps considering them as 
binding: e.g., in 2016, the UNSC has stressed the need that the parties implement these agreements,73 
emphasizing that the international rules applicable to the relations between Israel and Palestine 
includes “their  previous agreements  and  obligations”;74 the same request was advanced in 2019 by 
the UNGA.75  Indeed, the law of occupation allows belligerents to conclude such agreements, which 
must not alter the protection offered by the GCIV76 and must be interpreted coherently with the 
principle of self-determination of peoples.77 Accordingly, pending the occupation, due to the lack of 
any peace treaty concluded without coercion, protected persons continue to benefit of the protection 
offered by the GCIV, which cannot be altered by these agreements.78
Other rules of public international law complement the applicable legal framework. For instance, 
the principle of self-determination of peoples is taken into consideration since, as affirmed by the ICJ, 
the Palestinian people enjoys the right to self-determination.79 The customary content of this 
71
 See, e.g., the Israeli communication to the depositary of the Statute of the International Criminal Court (Depository 
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principle, which is enshrined also in Articles 1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter and in Common Article 
1(1) to the 1966 Covenants, has been clarified and codified by the UN General Assembly in a number 
of resolutions, such as the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States,80 that, albeit non-binding, have normative character.81
Finally, although this article acknowledges the role of Israeli domestic law and the relentless 
judicial activity of the Supreme Court of Israel concerning the Gaza Strip,82 under Article 38(1)(d) of 
the ICJ Statute, domestic decisions and legislation are not sources of international law.83 Compliance 
with domestic law is not a justification for lack of observance of international obligations under 
Article 27 of the VCLT, and Articles 3 and 32 of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) 2001 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (DARS).84 Accordingly, 
Israeli legislation and case law should be taken into account as state practice, which, assessed along 
with other states’ practice, may contribute to emergence of customary international law85 and to the 
interpretation of treaty provisions over time.86 However, they are not sources of international law.
III. THE LEGALITY OF THE CLOSURE IN ITS ENTIRETY
Pursuant to Article 43 of the HR, the main duty of the occupying power is to restore and ensure, as 
far as possible, the public order and the civil life in occupied territory, without altering, unless 
absolutely prevented, the law in force in the occupied territory prior to the occupation. The 
implementation of these duties requires occupying powers to undertake both negative and positive 
actions. The expression “as far as possible” means that the occupying power must endeavour to do 
everything that is in its power to restore and ensure public order and civil life, but the provision is not 
Conquest: International Law and the Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1891-1949 (London: Pluto Press, 2009), 117-
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violated if public order and civil life are disrupted notwithstanding the diligent conduct of the 
occupying power.87 International case law has considered the violation of this rule as a source of state 
responsibility.88
The land closure of the Gaza Strip in its entirety violates Article 43 of the HR for two reasons. 
First, the restrictions on movements of goods and persons have severely impaired the civil life of the 
Gaza Strip. “Civil life” regards the “whole social, commercial and economic life of the community”,89 
and “a variety of aspects of civil life, such as the economy, society, education, welfare, health, [and] 
transport”.90 As noted by the World Bank, the combined effect of the closure and the blockade is 
strangling the economy of the area.91 Moreover, the severe restrictions imposed on the movement of 
persons affect fields such as education, healthcare, and welfare. Israel is not acting diligently to 
comply with its duty to restore and ensure civil life, nor does it present any serious evidence that the 
closure is a last resort measure and that no other alternative is feasible.
It should be born in mind that that Hamas’s role in administering the Gaza Strip may reduce the 
latitude of the actions that Israel can undertake under Article 43 of the HR, which burdens the 
occupying power to acts “as far as possible”, and which should take into account the amount of 
authority actually exercised case by case.92 This argument is correct in relation to to some positive 
obligations pertaining to the duty to restore and ensure public order and the civil life: e.g., Israel 
cannot be considered responsible for not maintaining working healthcare or police systems in the 
Gaza Strip, since these governmental functions are exercised by Hamas. This conclusion is in line 
with the due diligence character of the duties embodied in Article 43 of the HR. However, the same 
provision embodies also negative duties, i.e., obligations not to interfere with public order and civil 
life: these negative duties are not governed by due diligence, but rather, are obligations of negative 
result, which are violated every time Israel interferes with public order and civil life in the occupied 
87
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territory.93 Accordingly, the closure of the Gaza Strip infringes upon the duty not to interfere with 
public order and civil life in the occupied territory; in other words, allowing the movement of goods 
and persons from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank and vice versa does not require the exercise of 
governmental powers exercised in Gaza by Hamas, but rather, it only demands negative actions from 
Israel.94 Clearly, as discussed below, Israel maintain the right to adopt specific targeted measures to 
ensure that no harm to its security is caused by this abstention of interference.95 
Furthermore, the law of occupation bans collective punishment under Article 50 of the HR, 
according to which “no general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise, shall be inflicted upon the population 
on account of the acts of individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and severally 
responsible.” Article 33 of the GCIV specifies that “no protected person may be punished for an 
offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of 
intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited.” This prohibition is reinforced by Article 75(2)(d) of the 
API. The ban on collective punishment does not refer to penalties decided by criminal courts, but 
rather, it pertains to negative actions of any kind inflicted on persons or entire groups of persons.96
The closure of the Gaza Strip affects thousands of people, allegedly due to the actions of some of 
them against Israeli security. Most of the protected persons that suffer the burden of the Israeli 
measures are not the addressees of any formal criminal convictions. Rather, they suffer negative 
consequences of the occupying power’s conduct in violation of international humanitarian law only 
because they are associated with those who threaten Israeli security. Accordingly, the illegality of 
some specific Israeli practices related to the Gaza Strip closure and their impact on protected persons 
collectively constitute illegal collective punishment under international humanitarian law,97 as 
emphasized by the UN HRC Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian 
territories in July 2020.98 
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To comply with international humanitarian law, Israel must find a way to restrict the negative 
effects of its policies only to those individuals who specifically and directly threaten Israeli security, 
while, at the same time, respecting the entire array of applicable international law rules. Whilst this 
article is normative in character and does not dare to offer policy suggestions, it is possible to envisage 
an increased role of high-tech intelligence and monitoring instruments to tailor the restrictions on 
freedom of movement.
IV. THE LEGAL UNITY OF THE OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY AS PRE-
CONDITION OF SAFE PASSAGE
This Section argues that Israel is bound to consider the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as a single 
territorial unit. Safe passage between the two areas is a necessary measure to guarantee the unity of 
the OPT, as recognized by Israel itself in a number of agreements concluded with the PLO. Since 
Israel, alleging security reasons, prevents the Palestinians from employing seaports and airports to 
move from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, and vice versa, Israel must allow the safe passage of the 
Palestinians through its own territory. However, the Palestinians do not have a right to enter Israel 
and reside therein, but rather, their entitlement to enter Israel is only linked to safe passage between 
one portion of Palestinian territory to another.
A. The Gaza Strip and the West Bank as a Single Territorial Unit
Palestinians have moved between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip relatively freely for years during 
the occupation. In particular, between 199999 and 2000,100 Palestinians were allowed to move 
between the two areas under the 1999 Protocol Concerning Safe Passage between the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip. This situation lasted until Israel decided to suspend safe passage in 2000 as a 
retaliatory measure in response to the violence that erupted in the OPT (so-called second Intifada), 
without alleging security reasons.101 
99
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Israel and the PLO undertook to consider the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as a single territorial 
unit in a number of agreements concluded in the 1990s. Article IV of the 1993 Declaration of 
Principles reads: “[t]he two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as a single territorial unit, 
whose integrity will be preserved during the interim period.” Similarly, under Articles XI(1) and 
XXXI(8) of the 1995 Interim Agreement, “[t]he two sides view the West Bank and the Gaza Strip as 
a single territorial unit, the integrity and status of which will be preserved during the interim period.” 
As already mentioned, irrespective of the characterization of Palestine as a state, these agreements 
are binding treaties under international law because they were concluded between two subjects of 
international law, a state (Israel) and a national liberation movement (the PLO). Moreover, the 
Supreme Court of Israel confirmed the idea that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank constitute a single 
territorial unit in several decisions adopted both before and after the Disengagement, recognizing that 
“[t]he two areas are part of mandatory Palestine. They are subject to a belligerent occupation by the 
State of Israel. From a social and political viewpoint, the two areas are conceived by all concerned as 
one territorial unit, and the legislation of the military commander in them is identical in content.” 102 
This case law reinforces the Israeli treaty commitments not to alter the unity of the two areas.
The temporary nature of the occupation obliges the occupying power to respect the status quo ante 
the occupation, which cannot be lawfully altered by the occupying power’s exercise of military force. 
Accordingly, the characterization of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as a single territorial unit is in 
line with the law of occupation, which prevents the occupying power from undertaking permanent 
changes to the occupied territory. Indeed, the HR emphasizes the temporary nature of the occupying 
power’s administration in a number of provisions, such as Article 43 of the HR, according to which 
the occupying power must administer the occupied territory “while respecting, unless absolutely 
prevented, the laws in force in the country”, and Article 55, which provides that: “The occupying 
state shall be regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of [public property]. It must safeguard 
the capital of these properties, and administer them in accordance with the rules of usufruct”. More 
explicitly, Article 47 of the GCIV stipulates that protected persons in occupied territory “shall not be 
102
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deprived, in any case or in any manner whatsoever, of the benefits of the present Convention by … 
any annexation by the latter of the whole or part of the occupied territory”. Finally, this principle is 
crystal-clear in Article 4 of the API, according to which “[n]either the occupation of a territory nor 
the application of the Conventions and this Protocol shall affect the legal status of the territory in 
question”. 
Before the Israeli occupation, the British Mandate comprised the Gaza Strip and the West Bank in 
the same self-determination unit.103 Under the system established by the League of Nations, mandates 
were used to create and preserve self-determination units, which were protected from dismemberment 
and permanent alteration.104 Since the principle of self-determination of peoples is applicable to the 
self-determination unit created by the British Mandate, to be lawful, any change of the unity between 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank should be the result of a free and genuine expression of the will of 
the Palestinian people.105 This is confirmed by paragraph 6 of the UNGA’s Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, according to which “[a]ny attempt 
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is 
incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations”.106 The 
application of this rule to self-determination units under occupation is confirmed by the UNGA in a 
number of resolutions on the self-determination of the Palestinian people,107 which demonstrate that 
any state that limits the self-determination of a people must protect the territorial integrity of that self-
determination unit. So far, Palestinians have always claimed the unity between the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank, as demonstrated by the abovementioned treaty provisions. Accordingly, thanks to the 
principle of self-determination and as acknowledged by the UNSC, “the Gaza Strip constitutes an 
integral part of the territory occupied in 1967 and will be a part of the Palestinian State”.108 
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Consequently, Israel cannot breach the territorial unity of the OPT – irrespective of any view on 
Palestinian statehood – without violating, at the same time, the law of occupation, the principle of 
self-determination of peoples, and the accords concluded with the PLO. Consequently, any Israeli 
policy of separation between the two areas would be illegal under international law. 
B. A Right of Passage for the Palestinians
On a number of occasions, Israel has maintained that, as any sovereign state, it has the right not to 
admit people demanding entrance into its territory.109 Although this view may be correct in 
principle,110 such an argument is untenable in relation to the situation of the Gaza Strip, which is a 
portion of territory under Israeli occupation.
Israel and the Palestinians consider territorial contiguity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank 
to be a key point for the fulfilment of the Palestinian right to self-determination, so that both parties 
have acknowledged the need to regulate safe passage in any instrument adopted between 1993 and 
2005. Article III(7) of Annex II to 1993 Declaration of Principles includes “[a]rrangements for a safe 
passage for persons and transportation between the Gaza Strip and Jericho area” among the issues to 
be agreed upon by Israel and the Palestinians. As a result, Articles VII, IX, and XI of Annex I to the 
1994 Agreement on Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, Article XXIX and Annex I of the 1995 Interim 
Agreement, Article 6(4) of the 1998 Wye River Memorandum,111 Article 2(b) of the 1999 Protocol, 
the 2005 Agreed Documents on Movement and Access from and to Gaza112 detail the ways in which 
such a passage should be conducted.
From the standpoint of international law, the situation of transit from the Gaza Strip to and from 
the West Bank is similar to that addressed by the ICJ in 1960, when Portugal claimed a right of 
passage to the extent necessary for the exercise of Portuguese sovereignty over some enclaves subject 
to the regulation and control of India.113 Correctly, Portugal pointed out that Portuguese sovereignty 
109
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over the area implies the possibility to accede it, and thus, a corresponding duty of India not to bar 
such a passage.114 Although the ICJ did not address this claim specifically,115 its judgment held that 
a series of agreements between Portugal and the various sovereigns over Indian territory are evidence 
of the existence of local custom in favour of the right of passage.116 The ICJ’s reasoning echoes the 
argument of the existence of a right in rem, anciently called international servitude.117 Similarly, the 
Palestinians can claim a right to accede a portion of their territory under the principle of self-
determination of peoples, and the aforementioned Israeli acknowledgement of a right of passage 
between 1993 and 2005 is evidence of the customary nature of such a right. The Palestinian claim is 
even stronger than the Portuguese one since, at that time, the ICJ recognized the Portuguese right to 
reach some colonial territory – a claim that today would be considered in conflict with the ban on 
colonial dominions enshrined in customary international law118 – whereas the Palestinian claim is 
based on the principle of self-determination of peoples. 
It follows that Palestinians have a right to transit over Israeli territory only to move between the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, rather than to enter Israel and swell therein. It should be emphasized 
that such a right to passage exists because of the very actions of Israel, which bars entrance and exit 
to and from the Gaza Strip via airspace and sea routes. As a result, the residents of the area have no 
alternative way to reach the West Bank other than crossing Israeli territory, and vice versa. 
Accordingly, the comparison between the Gaza situation with the border between Canada and the US 
suggested by the Supreme Court of Israel119 is groundless since the US is not occupying Canada, nor 
is it preventing the movement of Canadians through airspace or maritime routes. If Israel wants to 
avoid the passage of Palestinians through its territory, the Government may decide to let the 
Palestinians use longer routes not involving passage over the Israeli territory. Indeed, the Israeli 
decision to exercise some powers connected with the occupation, such as control over the borders of 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, is not a legitimate reason to reduce the rights of protected persons 
under international humanitarian law, as provided by Article 47 of the GCIV.
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Accordingly, the Israeli policy that “approval of the entry of residents of the Judea and Samaria 
Area to the Gaza Strip is highly limited, for humanitarian cases alone”120 is an unlawful measure that 
aims at breaking the unity of the two areas. The soundness of this conclusion is not altered by the 
consideration that Egypt controls one small portion of the borders of the Gaza Strip, preventing 
Palestinians from exiting the Gaza Strip from its southern border (through the Rafah Crossing).121 
Disappointing as the decision of the Egyptian authorities may be, it cannot be compared to the closure 
enacted by Israel. Egypt does not prevent the Palestinians from building a seaport or an airport to exit 
the area, as Israel does, but rather, it only exercises its right to deny entry to foreigners on its own 
territory. Moreover, even opening the Rafah Crossing would not allow Palestinians from Gaza to 
reach the West Bank: once in Jordan, they would be stopped by the Israelis who control the border 
between Jordan and the West Bank.
V. THE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF PERSONS BETWEEN THE GAZA STRIP 
AND THE WEST BANK
A. Limitations to Freedom of Movement under International Humanitarian Law
This sub-section explores how, in situations of occupation, international humanitarian law allows 
occupying powers to restrict the freedom of movement of protected persons in some instances. The 
relevant rules of international humanitarian law should be interpreted in light of applicable 
international human rights law standards pertaining to freedom of movement.122 It is argued that none 
of these measures can be applied to the entire population of the Gaza Strip, but rather, limitations to 
the freedom of movement of persons are lawful only if they affect specific individuals.
Article 27(4) of the GCIV affirms that the belligerents may take measures of control and security 
that are necessary as a result of the war, while Article 78 of the GCIV allows internment and assigned 
residence as safety measures in relation to protected persons if necessary for imperative reasons of 
security. Both of these provisions cannot be taken as collective measures, but rather, each case of a 
protected person must be decided separately.123 Article 78 of the GCIV on assigned residence does 
not apply to the situation of the Gaza Strip since it requires a belligerent “to move certain people from 
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their domicile and force them to live, as long as the circumstances motivating such action continue to 
exist, in a locality which is generally out of the way and where supervision is more easily 
exercised.”124 Moreover, assigned residence “obviously denotes a measure applicable to one person 
or one family, not the prohibition to enter or reside in a specified zone imposed upon an anonymous 
body of people such as all the nationals of a certain state.”125 As confirmed by the ICTY, “the 
internment and assigned residence, whether in the occupying power’s national territory or in the 
occupied territory, are exceptional measures to be taken only after careful consideration of each 
individual case. Such measures are never to be taken on a collective basis.”126 Accordingly, the 
situation of the Gaza Strip as such cannot be characterized as assigned residence, and is not governed 
by the relevant rules.
The same rationale is applicable to measures under Article 27(4) of the GCIV, of which Article 78 
of the GCIV is a specification. Under this provision, “the Parties to the conflict may take such 
measures of control and security in regard to protected persons as may be necessary as a result of the 
war.” Article 27(4) of the GCIV may be relevant in relation to the closure of the Gaza Strip if the 
occupying power demonstrates, on a case-by-case basis, that the specific limitation on freedom of 
movement of one specific individual is necessary as a result of the war.127 However, such a limitation 
is inapplicable to the movement of an unlimited and unidentified number of protected persons such 
as the entire population of the Gaza Strip. Indeed, as this rule is an exception to the freedom of 
movement of protected persons in occupied territory, the occupying power must assess the specific 
individual situation of a protected person in relation to “imperative measures of security” before 
limiting their freedom of movement.
The fact that the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are a single territorial unit means that Gaza’s 
residents in transit towards the West Bank do not seek to leave the occupied territory. This is an 
important point because Article 48 of the GCIV only obliges the occupying power to establish 
procedures to allow neutral protected persons to leave the occupied territory.
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Finally, it is necessary to note that the law of occupation allows the occupying power to reduce the 
freedom of movement of individuals in exceptional circumstances, such as in the case of pandemics 
such as the 2020 Covid-19 outbreak.128 Indeed, under Article 56 of the GCIV, the occupying power 
is responsible for “the adoption and application of the prophylactic and preventive measures 
necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics”.129 This can be seen as a 
specification of the duty to restore and ensure public order under Article 43 of the HR. Accordingly, 
measures aimed at limiting the freedom of moment to avoid the spreading a contagion should be 
considered lawfully adopted, if they are taken in compliance with human rights law standards on 
proportionality and necessity.
Absent any situation of hostilities in the Gaza Strip, limitations on the freedom of movement of 
protected persons may be undertaken only to restore and ensure public order under Article 43 of the 
HR and to fight against epidemics. This means that the occupying power may limit freedom of 
movement only following the rules in force in the occupied territory prior to the beginning of the 
occupation and pursuant to the means available to the ousted sovereign. Accordingly, an occupying 
power can only limit freedom of movement in light of the applicable rules of domestic law and 
international human rights law.
B. Freedom of Movement under International Human Rights Law
International human rights law governs the limitation on the freedom of movement of the population 
of the occupied territory. Article 12 of the ICCPR is particularly relevant since Israel is a party to this 
treaty and must apply it when acting in the occupied territory.130 Under the first paragraph of this 
provision, “everyone lawfully within the territory of a state shall, within that territory, have the right 
to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.” According to the Human Rights 
Committee, this provision “precludes preventing the entry or stay of persons in a defined part of the 
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territory.”131 This provision demands that Israel allows the movement of Palestinians between the 
Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which should be seen as the main components of the same state. The 
same argument can be advanced if one considers the OPT to be a self-determination unit rather than 
a state. The conclusion that the rights under Article 12 refer, mutatis mutandis, to movement within 
a self-determination unit is justified by the need to apply treaty provisions in light of other applicable 
rules of international law under the VCLT (such as the principle of self-determination of peoples). 
This interpretation is supported by the fact that the ICJ has considered Article 12 to be applicable to 
the OPT without holding, at the same, time, that Palestine is a state.132 
Equally relevant is Article 12(2) of the ICCPR, according to which “everyone shall be free to leave 
any country, including his own.” This provision imposes upon Israel the duty to allow people who 
live in the Gaza Strip to exit the area to move elsewhere, even if it does not confer any right to dwell 
within Israeli territory.133
The ICCPR provides also for some relevant limitations on the freedom of movement. Article 12(3) 
of the ICCPR maintains that freedom of movement “shall not be subject to any restrictions except 
those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (ordre 
public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other 
rights recognized in the present Covenant.” In situations of occupation, this provision should be 
interpreted as encompassing also a guarantee for the security of the occupying power and the 
provision of supplies for the civil populations, in light of the aforementioned international 
humanitarian law standards.134 It also covers situations in which public health requires the limitation 
of freedom of movement, as in the case of the fight against an epidemic under Article 56 of the GCIV. 
However, the conditions of legality of any limitations should follow international human rights law 
also in times of occupation. In particular, as affirmed by the Human Rights Committee, “the 
restrictions must not impair the essence of the right [and] the relation between right and restriction, 
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between norm and exception, must not be reversed.”135 The Human Rights Committee went on to 
affirm that these restrictions “must conform to the principle of proportionality” and “must be the least 
intrusive instrument amongst those which might achieve the desired result”.136 The applicability of 
these criteria to restrictions of freedom of movement in occupied territory has been authoritatively 
endorsed by the ICJ in 2004.137
It should be noted that states can adopt a number of positive and negative actions to respect, 
protect, and fulfil their human rights obligations. The basic protection is offered by negative actions, 
that is, abstention of interference with the enjoyment of a specific right. In relation to the freedom of 
movement, Israel does interfere with Palestinians enjoyment of their right to free movement. 
Particularly significant is the Israeli view that Israel maintains full discretion on who can move 
between Gaza Strip and West Bank.138 This position violates Article 12(3), which requires that any 
limitation on the freedom of movement must be necessary and proportionate in relation to one of the 
legitimate aims listed by that provision itself. Accordingly, Israel is breaching this rule since it fails 
to demonstrate case-by-case that the freedom of movement of one specific person from Gaza or into 
Gaza is a threat to Israeli security. It follows that, even though some threats to Israel originate from 
the Gaza Strip, the closure of the area and the associated regime of permits is not a lawful response 
to those threats since they are not the least intrusive instruments among those that might achieve the 
desired result and they are not proportionate.139
Furthermore, Israel facilitates the exit from the Gaza Strip of people who pledge not to return for 
a long period.140 This policy violates Article 12(4) of the ICCPR on the right to enter one’s own 
country, as well as the rights of protected persons to choose where to dwell in the occupied territory 
without interference from the occupying power, which is protected under Article 49 of the GCIV.141 
According to the Human Rights Committee, the notion of arbitrariness in Article 12(4) “guarantees 
that even interference provided for by law should be in accordance with the provisions, aims and 
objectives of the Covenant and should be, in any event, reasonable in the particular 
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circumstances.”142Article 12(4) is not subject to the restrictions of Article 12(3), so that “the word 
‘arbitrarily’ (‘arbitrairement’) is to relate exclusively to cases of lawful exile as punishment for a 
crime, whether this is accompanied by loss of nationality or not.”143 
In light of the above considerations, UN human rights monitoring mechanisms have warned Israel 
on its violations of human rights law in relation to freedom of movement on a number of occasions. 
In 2014, the Human Rights Committee expressed “concern that the blockade continues to hamper the 
freedom of movement with only limited categories of persons able to leave Gaza”144 and urged Israel 
to “[l]ift its blockade of the Gaza Strip, insofar as it adversely affects the civilian population [and to] 
[e]nsure that any measures restricting the freedom of movement of civilians and the transfer of goods 
from, into and within Gaza are consistent with its obligations under the Covenant.”145 The Committee 
went on to affirm that Israel “should take all necessary measures with a view to ensuring respect for 
the right to freedom of movement for Palestinians throughout the OPT, comprising the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, and ensure that any restrictions on freedom of movement 
are in line with its obligations under the Covenant.”146 In 2019, the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights requested Israel “to take immediate steps to facilitate the free movement of 
Palestinians within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip, 
and ensure that any measures restricting the free movement of civilians and goods from, into and 
within the Gaza Strip are in line with its obligations under the Covenant”.147 The same year, the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination affirmed its concerns “about the long-
standing blockade of the Gaza Strip imposed by the State party [which] continues to violate the right 
to freedom of movement”,148 urging Israel to “review its blockade policy and urgently allow and 
facilitate the […] right to freedom of movement”.149
Consequently, not only the land closure of the Gaza Strip goes beyond what is permitted to Israel 
under international humanitarian law, but also breaches the applicable rules of international human 
rights law.
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C. Freedom of Movement under the 1999 Protocol Concerning Safe Passage between the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip and the 2005 Agreed Documents on Movement and Access from and to 
Gaza
The commitments undertaken by Israel with the 1999 Protocol Concerning Safe Passage between the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the 2005 Agreed Documents on Movement and Access from and 
to Gaza, which directly address the freedom of movement of persons, complement the applicable 
legal framework to freedom of movement of persons between the two areas. To the best knowledge 
of this author, these agreements have never been formally terminated by Israel or by the Palestinians. 
Admittedly, if they are considered as treaties between a state and a movement of national liberation, 
as this author does, one could wonder which are the rules applicable to these instruments: in fact, the 
VCLT is not formally applicable150 and one should investigate customary international law rules 
developed on the basis of the scant state practice and opinio juris pertaining to treaties concluded 
between a state and a movement of national liberation. However, since all the rules on treaty 
termination require a written notification,151 it is possible to argue that even the termination of the 
1999 Protocol and the 2005 Agreed Documents would have required such a procedure, which, to the 
best knowledge of this author, has not been followed.152 Indeed, the ongoing applicability of these 
agreements is confirmed by the practice of the UNSC and the UNGA, which have invoked their 
implementation on a number of recent occasions.153
According to Articles 2(b)(1) and 2(c) of 1999 Protocol, Israel must ensure safe passage for 
persons and transportation during daylight hours, not less than 10 hours a day, both by means of 
privately owned road vehicles and public transportation. Under Article 2(c)(2), Israel must allow 
persons to travel through the Erez crossing point, the Tarkumya crossing point, and an additional 
crossing point around Mevo Horon. 
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Article 2(g) of the 1999 Protocol – according to which Israel may modify the route or enact 
closures for security or safety reasons only temporarily, ensuring that one of the routes is kept open 
for safe passage – clearly outlaws indefinite closures such as the one currently in place. Israel violates 
the Protocol also when it bars passage indiscriminately to different groups of persons, whereas Article 
2(h) of the Protocol only permits denial of passage to persons who have seriously or repeatedly 
violated the safe passage provisions detailed in the agreement.
Residents of the Gaza Strip have the right to enter Israel to reach the West Bank, as provided by 
Article 2(f) of the 1999 Protocol and as a consequence of the duty to consider West Bank and Gaza 
Strip as a single territorial unity. As Israel has bound itself to allow passage on its own territory rather 
than through other routes, now it is under a duty to allow passage of persons from Gaza and the West 
Bank, without renouncing its sacrosanct right to impose security inspections on the persons that transit 
through its territory.154
Under the terms of the 1999 Protocol, the Palestinian Authority Civil Affairs Office should work 
with Israel on the passage to and from the West Bank and Gaza, receiving applications from 
Palestinians and submitting them to Israel after a preliminary screening.155 Since the 1999 Protocol 
implements a duty established under the law of occupation according to Articles 7 and 47 of the 
GCIV, any lack of cooperation by the Palestinian leadership in the Gaza Strip does not relieve Israel 
from its obligations to allow safe passage as far as possible in compliance with the agreed terms.156
D. Issues Concerning Selected Specific Persons
This sub-section briefly addresses the restrictions on the freedom of movement from and to the Gaza 
Strip of two special groups of individuals: medical patients and students. The analysis of the relevant 
legal regime demonstrates lack of compliance with relevant international law standards.
1.  Permits for persons requiring medical treatment
Israel has conceded some permits for exiting the Gaza Strip due to health reasons. In particular, 
sometimes Israel allows people to leave the Gaza Strip in order to receive life-saving or life-changing 
medical treatment, to accompany underage children who needs the same medical treatments, to 
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accompany a patient, and to visit patients (i.e., a first-degree relative who requires protracted 
hospitalization, including in rehabilitation facility or in home hospitalization requiring medical 
supervision and monitoring, or a patient who is seriously ill with a potentially life-threatening 
condition).157 According to the World Health Organization (WHO), “in 2018, patients applying to 
exit Gaza for healthcare had the second lowest approval rate recorded by WHO since 2006, with 
15,834 (61.4%) of 25,811 patient permit applications approved.”158 The WHO went on to state that, 
although “[t]he reason for unsuccessful application is not stated in 70% of denials”, however, 
“[d]elays of patient permit applications continue to represent the largest reason for non-approval, with 
8,017 or 31.0% of patients receiving no definitive response … before the time of their hospital 
appointment.”159
Under the law of occupation, Israel has the duty to take care of the healthcare of the Gazan 
residents in the framework of the obligation to restore and ensure civil life under Article 43 of the HR 
and under Article 56 of the GCIV. Although the degree of control exercised by Israel is limited by 
the Hamas administration so that Israel is not required to take positive measures in the area, 
nonetheless, Israel maintains the responsibility not to raise any obstacle to the exercise of the right to 
health of the population in the Gaza Strip, in the form of a negative obligation of non-interference.160 
Accordingly, the Israeli permit policy, based on arbitrary decisions of the Israeli authorities, violates 
the law of occupation, since it creates an unjustified barrier to the enjoyment of healthcare for the 
local population.
Moreover, the Israeli practice is unlawful under Article 12 of the ICESCR, according to which 
states must allow the treatment of diseases and create conditions that would assure access to all 
medical services and medical attention in the event of sickness. Under this rule, the right to health 
does not comprise only life-saving and life-changing treatments, but focuses on “the highest 
attainable standard of health.” This includes also physical accessibility to “health facilities, goods and 
services,”161 which is not granted to the residents of the Gaza Strip. Consequently, the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights expressed concerns that Palestinians living in the Gaza Strip 
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have severely restricted access to health facilities, goods and services,162 and requested Israel to “(a) 
Facilitate the entry of essential medical equipment and supplies and the movement of medical 
professionals from and to Gaza; (b) Review the medical exit-permit system with a view to making it 
easier for residents of Gaza to access, in a timely manner, all medically recommended health-care 
services; (c) Ensure that all children referred for medical treatment outside Gaza can be accompanied 
by at least one parent.”163 Similarly, in the framework of the Universal Periodic Review, a number of 
states have urged Israel to lift its restrictions on the freedom of movement in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory in order to allow the enjoyment of the human right to health.164
Additionally, credible reports have highlighted the arbitrariness of some Israeli decisions. For 
instance, cancer patients were denied entry or did not receive any reply to their request for permission 
to cross the Gaza Strip border,165 or had their permission conditioned on the provision of information 
pertaining to armed groups in the Gaza Strip.166 Taking into account the impact on mental and 
physical health of such vulnerable patients, this practice amounts to inhumane treatment,167 which is 
prohibited by peremptory rules of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. 
Moreover, the use of permits for health reasons to induce the population of occupied territory to 
collaborate with the occupying power is a violation of Article 44 of the HR, according to which “a 
belligerent is forbidden to force the inhabitants of territory occupied by it to furnish information about 
the army of the other belligerent, or about its means of defence.”
2. Permits for students
Whereas Israel acknowledges that Palestinians from the West Bank may desire to enter Israel for 
educational purposes,168 Israel does not list education as one of the grounds for applying for a permit 
from the Gaza Strip into the West Bank. The only ground for education that is generally recognized 
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pertains to study abroad: Israel permits “travel by students for academic studies abroad (all degrees) 
and certification studies (engineers and technicians)” as well as “entry for the purpose of travel abroad 
… by residents of the Gaza Strip who are the recipients of a scholarship granted by a country that 
maintains diplomatic relations with the State of Israel, or an IO recognized by the State of Israel”.169 
Additionally, a specific ground for requesting permits pertains to those residents of Gaza who want 
“to receive medical training.”170
The Israeli policy is a blanket ban on Gazan students who want to develop an education in the 
West Bank or in Israel, in contrast to the past practice of many youths from the Gaza Strip who 
attended West Bank universities.171 This is a discriminatory measure since students from the West 
Bank are allowed to enter into Israel for educational purposes. Nonetheless, in relation to the requests 
to study abroad, the Supreme Court of Israel has recognized the freedom of the government to grant 
permits on the basis of discretional political interests.172
The law of occupation prescribes that an occupying power must facilitate the education of children 
only, under Article 50 of the GCIV. Nevertheless, education of children and adults falls under the 
scope of the duty to restore and ensure civil life under Article 43 of the HR.173 Accordingly, as far as 
possible, Israel must act diligently and in good faith to grant education of the Gaza residents. Since 
Israel prevents the access to educational institutions, it is not complying with the minimum standard 
of conduct (non-interference) required by Article 43 of the HR.
International human rights law is a source of more detailed obligations incumbent upon Israel. 
Article 13 of the ICESCR recognizes that the right to education applies to everybody and that “higher 
education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by every appropriate means, 
and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education.” Since the right of education 
entails physical accessibility of educational facilities,174 Israel, as the occupying power responsible 
for the Gaza Strip, has the duty to facilitate the access to education centres for Gazan residents, on a 
non-discriminatory basis, prioritizing the access to those programmes that are currently unavailable 
in the Gaza Strip. Accordingly, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
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expressed concerns “about the blanket ban on education in the West Bank imposed since 2014 on 
students from the Gaza Strip, which has limited their access to higher education in particular.” 175 The 
Committee went on to lament “the serious impact of the dual-use list on the ability of students in the 
Gaza Strip to enjoy their right to education, particularly in the fields of science and engineering, and 
the benefits of scientific progress and its applications due to the lack of essential education materials 
and equipment (arts. 13 and 15)”.176 The Committee concluded by urging Israel “to lift the above-
mentioned blanket ban and to allow the entry into Gaza of the materials and equipment necessary for 
educating students in the fields of science and engineering.”177
On these bases, Israeli refusal to grant any permit to potential students from Gaza who aspire to 
study in the West Bank is a violation of international law, both under the law of occupation and the 
ICESCR. To comply with its obligations, Israel should allow the movements of students between the 
two areas of the Occupied Palestinian Territory.
VI. MOVEMENT OF GOODS BETWEEN THE GAZA STRIP AND THE WEST 
BANK
A. Goods that Are Essential for the Population of the Occupied Territory
The law of occupation governs the transit of goods in relation to the welfare of the inhabitants of the 
occupied territory, with the aim of guaranteeing an adequate standard of living. These rules are 
applicable to the transit of goods from the Gaza Strip to the West Bank, even though different kinds 
of goods are treated differently under international law. The legal framework is complemented by 
Article 8 of the 1999 Protocol, which identifies the Karni crossing point for passage of commercial 
goods, without providing any detailed list of goods that can be allowed in the Gaza Strip. 
Before analysing the relevant provision, it is necessary to mention briefly the dire living conditions 
of the Gaza Strip. According to the World Food Programme, “the humanitarian conditions in Gaza – 
where poverty and food insecurity affect 53 percent and 68.5 of the population respectively – continue 
to deteriorate at an alarming pace following the collapse of all productive sectors, basic social services 
and infrastructures.” 178 The World Food Programme stressed that “Gaza’s socio-economic fabric is 
faltering due to the cumulative impact of 11 years of sea, land and air blockade.”179 
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The first international law provision that should be taken into account is the duty to restore and 
ensure civil life in occupied territory, under Article 43 of the HR. This rule obliges the occupying 
power to abstain from creating barriers to the development of the economy within the occupied 
territory. Some goods, such as those related to food, healthcare, and education, are strictly 
instrumental to the enjoyment of civil life.
Moreover, the occupying power cannot use starvation as a method of warfare. According to Article 
54(1) of the API, “starvation of civilians as a method of warfare is prohibited.” Paragraph 2 of the 
same provision affirms that “it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects 
indispensable to the survival of the civilian population … for the specific purpose of denying them 
for their sustenance value to the civilian population or to the adverse Party, whatever the motive, 
whether in order to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.” Under 
international law, “starvation” means “causing the population to suffer hunger, particularly by 
depriving it of its sources of food or of supplies.”180 The treaty rules on starvation correspond to 
customary international law181 and their violation is a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(25) of the 1998 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Less stringent rules apply to a blockade, 
which is unlawful if it “has the sole purpose of starving the civilian population or denying it other 
objects essential for its survival”.182 On the other hand, the modern ban on starvation is almost entirely 
incompatible with traditional siege warfare, which must be adapted today to allow the exit of the 
civilian population from the besieged area.183 Accordingly, the occupying power must allow the 
entrance in the occupied territory of goods that are necessary to avoid starvation.
Israel violated the prohibition of starvation until 2015, when the government calculated the amount 
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though this policy was envisaged not to lead anybody to death for lack of food,185 it caused the 
population to suffer serious hunger, which is one of the situations falling under the definition of 
starvation. Happily, this policy has been repealed amid widespread outrage after it was made public. 
Moreover, Article 55 of the GCIV demands that “to the fullest extent of the means available to it, 
the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population; it 
should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the 
resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.” This duty applies with regard to the entire 
population of the occupied territory rather than to civilians only, so that an occupying power is not 
relieved from this duty only because combatants infiltrated the civilian population.186 Article 69 of 
the API widens the scope of this duty, requiring that the occupying power must supply “clothing, 
bedding, means of shelter, other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population of the 
occupied territory and objects necessary for religious worship.” Accordingly, allowing the entrance 
of all these goods into the Gaza Strip would be a way to comply with these duties, whereas denial is 
a violation of these obligations.187 This is particularly relevant with reference to medical instruments, 
which are urgently needed in the Gaza Strip.188
Additionally, the occupying power has specific duties in relation to the transit of goods that are 
instrumental for the fight against pandemics such as the 2020 Covid-19 outbreak. As mentioned 
above, under Article 56 of the GCIV, the occupying power is responsible for “the adoption and 
application of the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious 
diseases and epidemics.” This last reference means that, to fight a contagious disease, an epidemic, 
or a pandemic, the occupying power must allow the transit in the occupied territory of specific 
medical supplies that may be needed to monitor and fight the contagion. Although the Government 
of Israel reported that it is allowing the transit of medical supplies into the Gaza Strip to fight against 
the virus,189 the healthcare institutions of the Gaza Strip appear to be significantly underequipped to 
fight against Covid-19.190  
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Finally, the limitation on transportation of some specific goods affects some rights protected by 
the ICESCR. In particular, all limitations on foodstuff, clothing, and housing items must comply with 
the right to adequate standards of living under Article 11. All limitations on the transit of medical 
supplies must be in line with the right to health pursuant to Article 12. All limitations on educational 
goods must respect the right to education embodied in Article 13. Under the ICESCR, states must not 
interfere with the enjoyment of these rights and any limitation must be necessary and proportionate.
Accordingly, the current policy of Israel in relation to essential goods in the Gaza Strip violates 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law. Not only should Israel allow the 
transit of essential goods, but also, it should bring in the relevant items if the local population is not 
adequately supplied.
B. Relief Goods in the Gaza Strip
The law of occupation embodies provisions to address a situation in which, notwithstanding the 
efforts of the occupying power, the population of the occupied territory is not adequately supplied. 
Under these circumstances, the occupying power must consent to the consignment of relief from 
states or humanitarian organizations. 
Under Article 59(1) of the GCIV, “if the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory 
is inadequately supplied, the occupying power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of the said 
population, and shall facilitate them by all the means at its disposal.” This provision embodies two 
separate obligations, pertaining to consent to relief operations and facilitation of the relief 
operation.191 
The GCIV does not provide the occupying power any ground for rejecting relief.192 In non-
occupied territory, a state can withhold consent to relief operations, since Article 70(1) of the API 
considers the consent of the state as a condition for the undertaking of the relief operation. The view 
that the same consideration should apply also in occupied territory193 is untenable since Article 70(1) 
of the API explicitly does not apply to occupied territory, as provided both by this provision and by 
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Article 69(2) of the API. Moreover, it is reasonable to afford more relevance to the consent of a state 
in relation to relief to its own population (Article 70(1) of the API) rather than in relation to occupied 
territory (Article 56 of the GCIV), where the occupying power’s administration has narrower powers 
to limit the rights of the local population. Accordingly, the occupying power cannot refuse access 
within its territory to foodstuff, medical supplies, and clothing (listed in Article 59(2) of the GCIV) 
if relief operations are offered by other states and/or international organizations and/or NGOs who 
act in impartial and purely humanitarian ways. The occupying power can negotiate technical 
arrangements such as those pertaining to performance of inspections and security checks over the 
relief consignments.194 These arrangements must be in accordance with applicable international 
human rights and humanitarian law, must be negotiated in good faith, and must be necessary and 
proportionate to fulfil the needs of the inhabitants of the occupied territory.195 The occupying power 
can reject relief from one supplier on the basis of its origins only if the local population of the occupied 
territory is adequately supplied in other ways.196
Applying these rules to the closure of the Gaza Strip, it is apparent that, in light of the humanitarian 
crisis in the area, Israel must allow the consignment of foodstuff, medical supplies, and clothing 
offered by impartial states, international organization, and NGOs, as asked by the UN on a number 
of occasion. For instance, in 2009, the UNSC called for “the unimpeded provision and distribution 
throughout Gaza of humanitarian assistance, including of food, fuel and medical treatment”.197 The 
Israeli refusal may be punished as a war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) of the ICC Statute, which 
includes “wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions” in the 
definition of the war crime of starvation.
VII. REMEDIES AGAINST THE ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
A. The Role of Palestine
There is no doubt that every internationally wrongful act of a state entails its international 
responsibility, as stated by Article 1 of the DARS. This principle applies to the breaches of all of the 
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rules mentioned in the previous sections as long as those violations are attributable to Israel198 and 
absent any circumstance precluding wrongfulness.199
The international responsibility of Israel means that this state is under a continued duty to perform 
the obligations breached, under Article 29 of the DARS. Pursuant to Article 30, Israel must cease all 
the violations and offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition. Applying Articles 
31, 34-37 of the DARS, Israel must make full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally 
wrongful act, in the form of restitution (if possible) or compensation. In the circumstances of the Gaza 
Strip closure, this means that Israel must re-establish safe passage of persons between the Gaza Strip 
and the West Bank, at the conditions agreed in the 1999 Protocol and in compliance with the relevant 
rules of the law of occupation and international human rights law. Israel must also allow the transit 
of goods into and from the Gaza Strip in line with the law of occupation, international human rights 
law, and the 1999 Protocol. Moreover, Israel is under a duty to pay compensations for the damage 
caused to Palestinians so far.
The primary entitlement to react to the Israeli violations stays with the Palestinians, whether 
Palestine is a state or not. Palestine has invoked the responsibility of Israel on a number of occasions, 
to no avail so far. Under Articles 49-53 of the DARS, Palestine is also entitled to undertake 
countermeasures with the goal of inducing Israeli compliance. These countermeasures must respect 
the ban on the use of armed force, international human rights and international humanitarian law 
rules, other jus cogens rules, diplomatic immunities, and the rules established to the peaceful 
settlement of international disputes. However, in light of the ongoing occupation of the entire territory 
of Palestine, it is highly unlikely that Palestine will be able to react by adopting countermeasures in 
an effective way.
Article 1(7) of the UN Charter demands that any dispute is solved peacefully, through diplomatic 
or adjudicative means that are exemplified in Article 33. Although Palestine is a member of the ICJ 
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Statute,200 in the absence of a specific consent by Israel, Palestine cannot bring the claim of Israeli 
responsibility before the ICJ.201 However, the lack of a forum that can address a violation of 
international law is irrelevant in relation to the duty to comply with the breached rules.
B. The Role of Other States and International Organizations
States other than Palestine and international organizations can play a role in relation to the Israeli 
violations of international law pertaining to the closure of the Gaza Strip. Although they overlap 
partially, two different levels must be kept separate: actions that other states must undertake under 
some primary rules versus actions that other states and international organization may undertake 
under the law of international responsibility.
In relation to the first level, all the states parties to the GCs – that is, all the states in the world – 
are under a duty to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law under Article 1 
Common to the Four GCs. As suggested by doctrine,202 recognized by the ICRC,203 and 
acknowledged by the ICJ,204 the duty to ensure respect for international humanitarian law implies the 
duty to react to other states’ violations of international humanitarian law. States have a duty to 
endeavour diligently so that other states do not violate international humanitarian law.205 Possible 
actions include: addressing questions of compliance through diplomatic channels, exerting diplomatic 
pressure; conditioning joint operations on a coalition partner’s compliance with its obligations; 
referring, where applicable, a situation to competent international bodies; applying measures of 
retorsion; and adopting lawful countermeasures.206 Accordingly, under Common Article 1, all the 
states in the world must endeavour to persuade Israel to comply with the international humanitarian 
law rules that are violated by the closure of the Gaza Strip. The limit to permissible actions based on 
Common Article 1 is that other states cannot violate international law, and in particular Israeli rights, 
200
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in order to fulfil their duty to ensure respect,207 apart from those violations that are justified by 
international law itself (e.g., pursuant to a circumstance precluding wrongfulness).
On the second level, other states and international organizations may invoke the consequences of 
the violations of some particular kinds of obligations. For instance, this is the legal basis of the several 
criticisms against Israel for lack of respect for the freedom of movement of the Palestinians in the 
framework of the Universal Periodic Review.208 Moreover, under Articles 40 and 41 of the DARS, 
in cases of gross or systematic failures to fulfil a peremptory norm of general international law (jus 
cogens), states shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means the breach, and must not 
recognize as lawful a situation created by such a breach, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining 
that situation. Article 42 of the 2011 ILC’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organizations (DARIO) mentions similar obligations in relation to cooperation between states and 
international organizations. It is undisputed that the principle of self-determination of peoples is jus 
cogens,209 as well as some rules of international humanitarian law.210 This duty of cooperation is 
mirrored by Article 89 of the API, according to which “in situations of serious violations of the 
Conventions or of this Protocol, the High Contracting Parties undertake to act, jointly or individually, 
in co-operation with the [UN] and in conformity with the [UN] Charter.” 
Moreover, Article 48 of the DARS governs the entitlement to react against an international 
wrongful act by states other than the directly injured one. If an obligation is owed towards the 
international community as a whole (erga omnes) or all the states parties to a specific convention 
(erga omnes partes), every state in the international community or party to that convention can 1) 
invoke responsibility; 2) demand cessation and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition; and 3) 
demand the performance of the obligation of reparation in the interest of the injured state or of the 
beneficiaries of the obligation breached. In both cases, states other than the directly injured one can 
adopt countermeasures.211 Similar rules are embodied in Article 49 of the DARIO in relation to the 
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entitlements of international organizations. The ICJ has recognized that both the principle of self-
determination of peoples212 and international humanitarian law obligations are obligations erga 
omnes.213 Moreover, the rules enshrined in the ICCPR, including the principle of self-determination 
of peoples under Article 1(1),214 and those embodied in international humanitarian law conventions 
are obligations erga omnes partes.215 
Applying these rules to the closure of the Gaza Strip, it is clear that other states must react to Israeli 
violations of international humanitarian law and other applicable rules. This means that states and 
international organizations must not acknowledge as lawful the consequences of the Gaza Strip 
closure, but rather, they must exercise diligently any possible pressure while respecting international 
law, to persuade Israel to comply with its obligations. 
The due diligence nature of the duty to ensure respect for international humanitarian law leaves 
states free to determine their course of action to persuade Israel.216 A willing state may decide to bring 
a claim against Israel before the UNSC, the UNGA, or a competent international court of tribunal 
with jurisdiction on the basis of the erga omnes / erga omnes character of the international law rules 
violated by Israel.217 However, the the erga omnes / erga omnes character of the rules violated by 
Israel cannot be used to circumvent the requirement of the consent of Israel to settle any dispute 
before an international court.218
If another state or international organization is willing to adopt countermeasures against Israel, it 
will be entitled to do so, since the closure of the Gaza Strip entails the serious violation of some 
obligations erga omnes and erga omnes partes. Under Articles 49-51 of the DARS, such a 
countermeasure must only aim at inducing Israeli compliance with international law, must be 
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temporary and proportionate, and must not affect some rules of international law such as the ban on 
the use of armed force, obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals, international 
human rights law, and other jus cogens rules. 
It follows that countermeasures can be adopted against the illegal denial of access to relief 
operations in the Gaza Strip. In particular, two scenarios must be distinguished: 1) cases in which 
Israel denies relief from a state or an international organization, and 2) cases in which the relief is 
offered by an NGO. States and international organizations can adopt countermeasures when Israel 
does not accept their offers or when it negotiated without good faith the technical specificities of 
relief consignment in order to frustrate the purpose of the offers. On the other hand, since NGOs are 
not subjects of international law, NGOs cannot adopt countermeasures. Nevertheless, states and 
international organizations can undertake countermeasures in the interest of the population of the 
Gaza Strip even if they do not claim the violation of their right to deliver relief.
Accordingly, states and international organizations may dispatch goods to the Gaza Strip as relief 
action even without Israeli consent, as long as the other rules on relief consignment in occupied 
territory are respected (in particular, the humanitarian and impartial characters of the relief action). 
Such measures, which in principle violate Israeli rights, would be lawful because they would be 
adopted as a countermeasure, if they do not involve the use of armed force, which is always 
prohibited.219 Since providing relief without the consent of the occupying power may violate its 
territorial sovereignty, especially in the situation of the Gaza Strip where the goods may be 
transported through Israeli territory, this countermeasure is justified only in light of the seriousness 
of the Gaza Strip closure, which is a violation of international law that has lasted for more than a 
decade.220
Finally, it should be noted that the closure impacts on the Palestinian ability to fulfill some of 
its own international human rights law obligations.221 The fact that after 2014 Palestine has joined 
several international human rights law treaties means the Palestinian administration must respect, 
protect, and fulfill those rights in areas under its jurisdiction. Without entering the complex – and 
largely unexplored – debate of the partition of responsibilities between Israel and Palestine in light of 
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the Oslo accords,222 suffice it to say, for the purposes of this article, that Palestine has claimed that 
the closure prevents it from implementing its international obligations. Indeed, in relation to the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Palestine has argued 
that the “occupying forces prevent the relevant Palestinian parties from moving between the West 
Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip in order to carry out their functions and reach 
women victims.”223 This situation may be relevant for the application of international human rights 
law to some people, which should be considered outside Palestinian jurisdiction, or to assess the 
diligence undertaken by the Palestinian administration in relation to the implementation of due 
diligence obligations. However, the lack of implementation of obligations upon Palestine, as a such, 
cannot be considered as an international wrongful act by Israel.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
This article has demonstrated that the land closure of the Gaza Strip violates a number of rules 
international law. Although Israel has the right to limit the movement of persons and goods for 
security reasons, the relevant measures should be tailored on specific threats rather than being applied 
indiscriminately. In particular, the closure of the Gaza Strip should comply with rules embodied in 
international humanitarian law, international human rights law, the principle of self-determination of 
peoples, and the agreements concluded between Israel and the PLO.
Since the Gaza Strip is under Israeli occupation, and due to the principle of self-determination of 
peoples and the Israeli-PLO agreements, Israel must consider the Gaza Strip as a portion of a wider 
single territorial unit also comprising the West Bank. Accordingly, Israel must allow passages of 
persons between the two areas, following the agreed standards embodied in relevant Israeli-PLO 
agreements, which governs that passage still today. 
Moreover, Palestinians enjoy freedom of movement under the ICCPR, to be interpreted and 
applied in light to international humanitarian law. Accordingly, Israel can restrict freedom of 
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movement only to restore and ensure public order, following the rules in force before the occupation 
or to fight epidemics. Any restrictions must be necessary, proportionate, temporary, reversible, and 
non-collective. 
In relation to goods, the law of occupation demands that Israel allow the transit of food into the 
Gaza Strip that is necessary to comply with the ban on starvation, and to provide food, medical 
supplies, clothing, bedding, means of shelter, and other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian 
population. Furthermore, the law of occupation forbids Israel from barring access to relief 
consignment in the Gaza Strip if the relief is humanitarian in character and impartial. 
In response to these violations of international law, Palestine as a state and/or the PLO, has the 
right to invoke Israeli responsibility, to demand cessation and reparation, and to adopt 
countermeasures. However, the lack of Israeli consent to settle the dispute judicially and the reality 
of occupation limit the Palestinian ability to react lawfully to Israeli violations. Nonetheless, since 
Israel is violating some jus cogens rules that produce erga omnes / erga omnes partes obligations, 
states not directly injured by Israeli violations and international organizations must not recognize as 
lawful the closure of the Gaza Strip and must cooperate to bring it to an end through measures 
permitted by international law.
